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This study focuses on Palestinian identity in refugee camps and their international representation 
of rights by the PLO. The goal of this research is to understand how the meaning of the Right of 
Return has developed through generations of Palestinian refugees residing in camps, in contrast 
with the international community discourse presented by the PLO on this topic.  
After almost two decades since the PLO’s leadership renewal, a gap is visible between 
Palestinian political representation and the sentiments of Palestinians on the ground. There are 
growing perceptions dissatisfaction with the current leadership, especially from the perspective of 
refugees. More often than not, refugees describe themselves as marginalized by both the Israeli 
occupation and the Palestinian leadership itself. Since the international community embodied by 
the United Nations has been the stage for most of the advocacy for Palestinian rights, it is key to 
understand how the PLO has presented the Palestinian struggle in fact representative of 
Palestinian sentiments towards their perceived rights. This study shows how the PLO’s strategy 
has shifted towards the two-state solution, sidelining the possibility of the implementation of the 
right of return, while Palestinian refugees still nurture the hope of return and the liberation of 
historic Palestine.  
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It was Ramadan of the year 2015 when a Palestinian man and his family asked me 
to drive them to a village once called Zakariya. This family, who grew up in Dheisheh 
refugee campnear Bethlehem, had been forced to leave their homes in 1948 during the 
Nakba and had since then endured for three generations in refugee camps now located in 
the West Bank, under the Palestinian Authority (PA). As most Palestinian citizens of the 
West Bank, both the man and his son had no access to their former land – the crossingof 
the checkpoints that now divided them from their homes, now under Israeli rule, was not 
allowed. Luckily, during the holy month of Ramadan, some families, including this father 
and his son, were granted permits to cross the border (by foot) and reach Jerusalem.  
I waited for them both at the exit of Checkpoint 300 between Bethlehem and 
Jerusalem. Though it had been decades since his last visit, the father could still remember 
the way to his parents’ village, only forty-five minutes away from the refugee camp. As 
we drove on the highway, he told his eldest son,sitting in the backseat of the car,about all 
of the invisible villages that once stood proudlyalong the road. His son nodded in silence, 
documenting everything on his camera. 
Zakariya, which had once been the longest lasting Arab community in the 
southern Jerusalem Corridor, and home to 1,180 Palestinians before the Nakba, was 
nothing but sparse remains.Still, this man could remember every detail of his original 
homeland – the mosque, the school, the houses of his relatives – as if it remained 
standing today. From the top of a hill nearby, he would point to the horizon, showing his 
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son his rightful inheritance, almost as if his land hadn’t been confiscated for nearly seven 
decades.1 
The hope of return, as unlikely as it is today, is not unusual for Palestinian refugee 
families, especially those who still live in refugee camps. Though the international 
discourse on the topic has completely shifted to the two-state solution, thus eliminating 
the possibility of returning to historic Palestine, the promise of return remains vibrant in 
the hearts of even the youngest generation of Palestinian refugees.  
Since the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) accepted the 
UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyResolution 194 (III) of 1948 as the ground for the 
Palestinian right of return, it has established “crucial limitations on a putative absolute 
right of return.”2 On the other hand, recent opinion polls in West Bank and Gaza show 
that Palestinians do not approve of the PLO or its Executive Committee to make critical 
decisions that dictate the future of the Palestinian people3.This growing gap between the 
people and its leadership is even more noticeable in Palestinians refugee camps,residents 
often describe themselves as marginalized by both the Israeli occupation and the 
Palestinian leadership itself. 
The goal of this study is to investigate how the discourse of Palestinian refugee 
rights in the international community, specifically the right of return, is in fact 
                                                          
1 See Figure 1 in Appendix 
2Khalidi, Rashid I. “Observations on the Right of Return”. Journal of Palestine 
Studies 21 (1992). University of California Press: 36 
3Dr. KhalilShikaki, and WalidLadadweh. "Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (57) Press 
Release." Palestinian Center for Policy and Surveu, September 21, 2015, Press Release 
sec. Accessed December 2, 2015. http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/619. 
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representative of Palestinian sentiments on the ground. The research focuses on 
interviews with Palestinian refugees still residing in camps in the West Bank and Jordan, 
which were then compared with recent statements of the PLO addressing the United 
Nations. I hypothesize that though the dream of returning to their homeland is still alive 
in the camps, the beliefin the possibility of returning has diminished due to the increasing 
frustration of Palestinians with the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA). In addition, I 
believe that this phenomenon happens to a lesser extent outside of Palestine, such as 
Jordan, whose population has not been directly effected by the decisions of the PLO and 
PA. 
LiteratureReview 
My experience with the family from Dheisheh is not unique to researchers in 
Palestinian refugee camps.GhadaKarmi, when visiting Palestinian refugee camps in 
Beirut, writes about her astonishment realizing how vivid the hope of “going back” was 
among children. Karmi points out the contradiction of these sentiments, especially since 
“the international community had no intention of implementing the refugees’ right to 
return”.4It does not seem logical that a concern that is so central to the identity of 
Palestinians world-wide could have faded from the mouths of Palestinian leaders at the 
negotiation table while remaining so vital to their constituents. Instead, Palestinian 
leadership, as it will be discussed further, has focused most of its efforts in showing its 
commitment to the two-state solution. As much as it has been discussed as the platform 
for negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, the two-state solutionsimply eliminates 
                                                          
4GhadaKarmi. Married to Another Man Israel's Dilemma in Palestine. London: Pluto Press, 
2007. 227. 
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the possibility of returning to former Palestinian villages inside the State of Israel. As 
Karmi concludes, no settlement with Israel that does not address the right of return, a 
core issue for Palestinian refugees, can be considered “just, legal or an end to the 
conflict.”5 The two-state solution would therefore not solve the problem as much as it 
would accept the legitimacy of occupation and denial of Palestinian rights. 
Other sources have drawn attention to the challenges posed by Palestinian 
leadership before the United Nations towards the rights of Palestinian refugees. As the 
PLO opted for a bid as a  “non-member observer state status” at the UN – which was 
granted under United Nations General Assembly resolution 67/19 on November 2012 –
the 2011-2012 survey by the “BADIL Resource Center” reveals this approach is not 
necessarily beneficial to all sectors of Palestinian society. While Palestine’s recognition 
in the United Nations focuses on the Palestinian right of self-determination and defined 
borders, it does not emphasize the terms of Palestinian refugee rights such as the right of 
return. In fact, the BADIL survey explains how official diplomatic efforts adopted by 
Security Council and General Assembly are inherently politically driven and will tend to 
emphasize their own national interests, the balance of power and the compromise 
between the two sides of the bargaining table.6As a result, fundamental rights and 
freedoms of Palestinian refugees have been sidelined, including the right of return. A 
familiar question remains – why would an organization like the PLO, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization agree to negotiate such terms? 
                                                          
5Karmi, 228 
6Badil Resource Center. Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internatlly Displaced Persons 2010-
2012.VII. Bethlehem, Palestine: BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee 
Rights.xii. 
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Rashid Khalidi explains this transition. Until 1968, the concept of return was 
under the idea of total liberation of Palestine, namely the dissolution of Israel and a 
recreation of an Arab Palestine. Initially, it was a rather simple concept – once Palestine 
was liberated from the Israeli occupation, Palestinians would return to their land. 
Diplomacy and compromise were not the main concern of Palestinian leadership at the 
time, which explains the lack of specificity on the terms of the right of return when 
drafting the Palestinian National Charter in 1964. It was only in 1968, when the PLO’s 
leadership had been taken over by commando groups, that the right of return gained a 
central part in the revision of the National Charter. Namely, Article 9 defined the goal of 
the struggle for the liberation of Palestine as “‘the return to it,’ and self-determination and 
sovereignty in Palestine.”7 But this position did notstay that way for long –asKhalidi 
points out, this view suffered a drastic shiftby 1974.  This change took place once the 
Palestinian National Council (PNC), the legislative body of the PLO, introduced the 
“Provisional Political Program” which included the idea of establishing “an independent 
fighting national authority of people on any piece of Palestinian land which is liberated.”8 
For the first time in the history of the PLO, the idea of fighting for a Palestinian state that 
does include the entirety of historic Palestine was being advocated for. Once this idea 
was introduced, the PLO and the PNC progressively gave up on the use of militant 
language and started adopting internationally recognized principles instead.  
Finally in 1988, both official documents and statements from PLO leaders used 
specific language connected to UN resolutions when addressing the issue of the right of 
return. Namely, the PLO began using specific language from the 




UNGeneralAssemblyResolution 194 (III) of 1948, previously rejected by Palestinian 
leadership, which states that: 
“refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors 
should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date; and compensation 
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or 
damage to property…”9 
By accepting Resolution 194, the PLO gave those who choose not to return the 
opportunity of being compensated for the property. This means it also accepts the 
creation of the state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian’s rights. From this point 
onwards, the discussion over the destination of those that would fall under the right of 
return disappeared from PLO official statements. While leaving space for ambiguity and 
negotiation, this shift started a new trend of thinking in the leadership of the PLO, which 
some PLO spokesmen came to interpret this to mean that “Palestinians may return to live 
in the Palestinian state to be established, rather than Israel proper”10. 
Meanwhile, Palestinian public opinion has far from followed the same political 
reasoning. In a poll conducted earlier this year, David Pollock revealed that “only 14 
percent of West Bankers, and 24 percent of Gazans, select ‘working to establish a 
Palestinian state’ as their top priority”.11 The PLO may have focused their diplomatic 
efforts on international recognition as a viable state, but the truth remains that building a 
Palestinian state is not a priority for most Palestinians today. As disliked by the 
international community and undiplomatic as the poll results reveal, most Palestinians 
                                                          
9Khalidi, 33 
10 Ibid. 
11David Pollock. "Compromise for Now, the End of Israel for Later." Washington Institute, 
November 19, 2015.  
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(58 percent of West Bankers and 65 percent of Gazans) still advocate for “continuing the 
struggle...until all of historic Palestine is liberated" and for armed "resistance" as a means 
toward that end.”12 It is no accident that a recent poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy 
and Survey Research (PSR) shows that a majority of Palestinians are unfavorable towards 
the PLO and its Executive Committee, and does not trust it to make crucial decision on 
behalf of the Palestinian people. In terms of the PA, the majority sees it as a burden on 
Palestinians and demands its dissolution.13This is not to say that Palestinians would not 
accept any form of compromise – according to Pollock’s findings, half of more West 
Bankers, and a substantial numbers of Gazans, would “probably” compromise if doing so 
might “help to end the occupation” and lead to Palestinian independence.14 The two 
major issues they would be willing to compromise on are first, "‘the principle of two 
states for two peoples, the Palestinian people and the Jewish people,’ and, second, 
limiting the right of return to the West Bank and Gaza, ‘not to Israel.’"15 
Still, it is important to note that these numbers, especially on the latter issue, may 
vary in Palestinian refugee camps and are not necessarily representative of those whose 
rights would be severely affected by the terms of the right o return. As Pollock clarifies, 
any survey on Palestinian public opinion must take into account the difference between 
the Palestinian “street” and the “elite”: “the political leadership, the intelligentsia, the 
moguls of Palestinian media (and social media), and the most prominent Islamic 
activists.”16 This is particularly important when considering how Palestinian refugees in 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 





the camps are regarded within Palestinian society itself. GhadaKarmi, during her visit to 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, mentions how it should come as no surprise that 
refugee camps became the birthplace of the fighters of the PLO and later Gaza’s Hamas 
activists.17 Palestinian refugees, especially those still residing in the camps, are the ones 
that have suffered the most since the start of the Israeli occupation. Their rights have been 
marginalized by both Israeli and Palestinian authorities, and have been sidelined for the 
sake of diplomatic negotiations. Meanwhile, the camps still provide Palestinian 
leadership with armed forces when diplomaticefforts seem to give little hope for a 
solution to the conflict. The paradox is that once armed struggle gives place to 
diplomacy, it is the rights of those who fought that are being sidelined at the forefront of 
the United Nations. 
So how relevant is the PLO in terms of representing the Palestinian people 
internationally?  Ghait Al-Omari, former Palestinian negotiator, sheds light on the 
number of key Palestinian constituents that are not represented in the PLO.  First, Hamas 
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are not members, but this falls beyond the internal 
problems of representation within the PLO. As Al-Omari explains, the current PLO 
leadership is highly outdated – the quota system includes substantial representation of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and other Marxist and Arab 
nationalist groups that have simply become irrelevant since the 1970s and 1980s. In 
addition, it has been almost twenty years since the last regular session of the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC) in 1996. The PLO’s leadership has not been renewed in two 
decades, excluding “a whole generation and failing to capture current Palestinian political 
                                                          
17Karmi, 227 
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dynamics.”18 International Palestinian leadership, represented by the PLO, does not only 
fail to represent Palestinian refugees, but in fact has progressively receded to irrelevance 
in terms of embodying the political positions of Palestinian today. 
While Palestinian refugees have not been able to count on the PLO to advocate 
for the implementation of their right of return – as revealed by previous literature – many 
still have found alternative ways to cope with the trauma of dispossession and hardship 
while living in the camps. On a study made with Gaza residents, Ilana Feldman illustrates 
the nostalgia that became an inherent part of reflections on home before 1948. After 
decades of occupation and dispossession, she mentions how recollections of “ayyam al-
balad”(the days of the land) are remembered as the inverse of the present, a time and a 
place where life is idealized, namely “a time of safety.”19  Feldman mentions one 
particular example, when a refugee from Khan Yunis, originally from al-Jura, described 
life before the Nakbaas a “sweet life” and wished he could return to live in his land even 
if for one day, so he could die there. He referred to his villageas “paradise; it was the 
flower of the cities.”20 As an effect of the dispossession of Palestinian land and denial of 
their rights, many Palestinian refugees have cultivated a vivid and idealized image of 
their original villages, even though the discussion on the possibility of return has been 
frozen since 1988. 
                                                          
18Ghaith Al-Omari. "Palestinian Succession: An Overview of Institutional Turmoil" Washington 
Institute. 28. October, 2015. 5. 
19Ilana Feldman. “Home as a Refrain: remembering and Living Displacement in Gaza”. History 
and Memory 18 (2006). Indiana University Press: 19. 
20 Ibid. 
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In terms of the PLO and Palestinian refugees in Jordan, it is important to note the 
consequences of Black September, the clash between the PLO and the Jordanian armed 
forces during 1970-1971, which ultimately resulted in the PLO’s expulsion from Jordan 
Nabil Marshood, while interviewing Palestinian refugees in Zarqa camp, revealed how 
Palestinian patriotism suffered vastly after Black September. Even inside Palestinian 
refugee camps, refugees noticed a shift in the camp school’s curriculum, which drifted 
from the Palestinian cause to the ideas of peace and human rights.21As Khalidi explains, 
Black September also shifted the “massive public support the PLO enjoyed in 
Jordan.”22IThe incident affected both the way supporters and the Jordanian government 
perceived Palestinian patriotism, which has since then decreased in public spaces in 
Jordan. 
Methodology 
I. Shaping the Research 
Initially, the goal of this research was to understand whether the general discourse 
on the right of return was still relevant and representative of Palestinianidentity in refugee 
camps across generations. There were two main questions guiding this study: first, how 
the hope in the right of return had developed after three generations since 1948 and 
second, if Palestinian identity varied depending on the location of the refugee camp (i.e. 
if the camp is located inside or outside of historical Palestine). The idea was to interview 
                                                          
21Nabil Marshood. Voices from the Camps: A People's History of Palestinian Refugees in 
Jordan, 2006. University Press of America, 2010: 47 
22RashidKhalidi. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National 
Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 198. 
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and survey residents from two refugee camps, one inside of the West Bank and one in 
Jordan. Two members from each generation since the Nakbawould be interviewed, one 
female and one male, in addition to a written survey that would be handed out to thirty 
residents from each camp (ten members from each generation).  
What was missing from this approach was understanding what “the general 
discourse on the right of return” means in practice. The main document used to 
understand this topic was “The Question of Palestine and the United Nations”23, which 
outlines how the issue of Palestinian statehood and rights has developed since 1947 in the 
international community. It came to my attention that, according to the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988 (III), which states that “the 
designation ‘Palestine’ should be used in place of the designation ‘Palestine Liberation 
Organization’”at the UN, the PLO essentially became the exclusive representative of 
Palestinian rights before all nations.  
This opened a new door for investigating the issue. Through reading United 
Nations statements from the past three years made by President Mahmoud Abbas and 
Riyad Mansour, the Palestinian Ambassador to the UN, it was surprising to see how the 
subject of the right of return has little mentioned at all. This observation was what shaped 
the current goal if this study, which aims at understanding how and if the PLO represents 
the rights of Palestinian refugees, and if what is said before the international community 
is in fact an accurate depiction of Palestinian refugees’ sentiments on the ground.  
                                                          
23United Nations Department of Public Informatio.The Question of Palestine and the 
United Nations. April 2008. 24. 
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There were two possible paths of investigation came to mind – one, was 
interviewing NGOs for Palestinian Refugee rights such as BADIL and UNRWA, as well 
as PLO representatives, and comparing the two. The second pathwould be focusing on 
the comparison of official UN statements and interviews with current residents of refugee 
camps. There are limitations to both – the first approach is not the direct voice of 
Palestinian refugees, and not all PLO representatives necessarily participate in the 
discussions that take place before the UN. The second approach is not flawless either – 
the opinion of a small number of refugees from two specific camps does not necessarily 
define what the right of return means for all Palestinian refugees today. Still, I chose the 
latter methodology, under the belief that focusing on the grassroots of refugee camps 
might reveal more of an in-depth understanding of their perceptions of the right of return. 
II. Selecting Refugee Camps 
Considering the above, the next step was to find families that had living members 
from all three generations, which proved to be more challenging than expected. Due to 
my previous contact with Dheisheh refugee camp in Palestine, finding families to 
interview there was easier than in Jordan. Ideally, I wanted to find a camp with a similar 
background of Dheisheh, especially one that was mostly Palestinian, established around 
1948 and with a similar population size. This was not possible, particularly in terms 
ofestablishment date – Jordan’s oldest Palestinian refugee camps, such as Zarqa, Jabel el-
Hussein and Wihdat – have developed into cities and neighborhoods that are not solely 
for Palestinian refugees anymore.In order to insure the reliability of the results, it was key 
to find a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan that would allow a consistent comparison 
with the data from Dheisheh. 
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Finally, a contact with Hittin camp, also known as Marka refugee camp, was 
found. I was able to get in touch with members from the same family of 1948 Palestinian 
refugees residing in Hittin, who had livedin Karameh and Baqa’a before settling in 
Marka. Though Hittin camp has a population over three times size of Dheisheh (48,492 
residents as opposed to 14,395 in Dheisheh, according to BADIL)24 and was founded 
after the 1967 Israeli occupation, in terms of the camp’s character and identity, Hittinhad 
many features that reminded me of Dheisheh. As Dheisheh, Hittinis also located by the 
side of the road with markets and shops surrounding it, and only a narrowentry allowing 
the entrance of the residents. They are both slightly isolated, but close enough to a 
mainavenue that would allow interaction with the rest of the district. Additionally, both 
camps are similarly close to its country’s capital (Jerusalem for Dheisheh and Amman for 
Hittin) – though considering Dheisheh residents cannot reach it due to movement 
restrictions under the Israeli occupation. These resemblances enabled the research to 
continue and made the collection of relevant data possible.Still, readers of this research 
must keep in mind that the results may not represent sentiments of Palestinian refugees 
residing incamps that have suffered a higherinflux of refugees from Syria and Iraq, or 
that have grown to the point that they are not considered “camps” anymore. 
III. Conducting the Interviews 
Initially, I intended on doing both interviews and surveys in order to obtain more 
material to analyze. However, after conducting a test for the survey I realized that trying 
to quantify complex issues as identity were not as helpful as having face-to-face 
conversations on the topic. In addition, since the first generation of the Nakba includes 
                                                          
24BADIL, Survey 2011-2011, 11. 
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senior refugees, some past the age of ninety, the survey was simply not a helpful platform 
to record how they related to their homeland. 
In Palestine, a former resident of the camp, who was especially trained for this 
research, conducted interviews in Arabic. The results were recorded in Modern Standard 
Arabic, which I translated upon receiving the written notes. There were six interviews 
with members of one extended family, one female and one male from each generation. 
Though the interviewees were not from the same family as the interviewer, the familiarity 
with the camp and the language made it easier for the subjects to give candid answers on 
the topic. In addition, since the interviewer was from the camp himself, finding a family 
that would fit the requirements for the research was not as difficult.  
The interviews in Jordan were more challenging than the above. The contact I had 
with Hittin was through an acquaintance, as opposed to a former member of the camp, 
which made finding families much more difficult. In total, six members from one family 
of 1948 refugees were interviewed. However, for the first and third generations, it was 
not possible to find male subjects to discuss the topic. This is due to two factors – the 
gender of the researcher and the challenge of finding living members of the first 
generation of 1948 refugees. This may reflect in the results of this study, since more 
women were interviewed in Jordan than men. I performed all the interviews in Arabic, 
initially with the help of a male translator for certain key words. Some of the challenges 
involved in this method are explained in the next sub-section of the research. 
The interview questions, attached to the appendix of this study, focused on three 
themes: a) development of Palestinian refugee identity; b) connection to the homeland, 
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and c) definition of the right of return. They purposefully did not use any specific 
language or references, in order to allow the interviewees to speak from their own 
perspectives and not be guided by the formulation of the questions. This proved to be a 
successful format, as long as it included follow up questions and informal conversation, 
which allowed the interviewees to tell personal stories and comments that revealed the 
basis of their identity. With the intent of not to lead the interviews to particular answers, 
no questions specifically about Palestinian leaderships were asked, though it still came up 
in a number of conversations naturally. 
All of the refugees interviewed signed a written consent form that allowed me to 
use the information for this research while preserving their identities. With this in mind, 
no real names will be use in the results section, as well as any information that might 
reveal their identity. There was one case of an illiterate interviewee, in which the 
subject’s son read the consent out loud signed on her behalf. 
IV. Further challenges 
There were a number of challenges that were not anticipated. First, in the case of 
Dheisheh, the interviewees were often suspicious about the purpose of the research. 
Espionage by the American and Israeli government seemed to be in the collective 
memory of the camp, even if the interviewee himself was a Palestinian refugee from the 
Dheisheh as well. Participants were still reluctant in giving personal information about 
themselves due to mistrust. In Jordan, this problem was not encountered. While 
Palestinian refugees from Dheisheh were used to the presence of foreigners doing 
research on a number of issues, refugees from Hittin did not have as much knowledge 
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about what the concept of right of return. There, it was perceived more as a shared 
sentiment than a political term. 
As mentioned before, there were also gender issues involved while conducting the 
interviews. In Palestine, female subjects of the third generation showed signs of 
discomfort while talking to a male interviewer, which affected the depth of their answers. 
However, in Hittin, there was the opposite problem - as a woman, it was easier to find 
female interviewees to talk to about the matter, which explains the higher number of 
women interviewed in Jordan. Though I performed all the interviews in Arabic, the 
presence of a translator was key in order to understand specific words and concepts.When 
talking to the women, however, it was not acceptable for the translator to accompany me, 
which led me to conduct the interviews in Arabic myself. Though it was possible to 




1.1 Dheisheh Camp, Palestine 
 When asked about their place of origin, there was no hesitation in their answers – 
Ahmad and Khadija referred immediately to memories of their village Zakariya, which 
they were forced to leave in1948. Ahmad, now ninety-three years old, lived until the age 
of twenty-five in his village before he was forced to leave with his family in 1948. Still, 
after sixty-eight years living in Dheisheh, he considers Zakariya his true home:  
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“Everything reminds of Zakariya, especially old men around me. I see Zakariya 
in my dreams - my house and my family sitting eating lunch together; there, 
everything is perfect. All the memories I love are from my village, that’s where I 
want to die” 
 
 Even his wife, Khadija, considersZakariya her place of origin. Her daughter 
Fatima corrected her – “Mother, you are not from Zakariya, you are from 
BeitNatif!.”Khadija explained she was originally from BeitNatif but that she never came 
back after 1947, when she married Ahmad and moved to his village. “Sure, I haven’t 
lived for long in Zakariya but I count myself as originally from there,” she said, “my 
house was my husband’s house. I don’t want to go back to BeitNatif. Everything in my 
life reminds of Zakariya.” 
 Ahmad and Khadija’s house is located on“Zakrawyastreet”. Before the new wave 
of refugees in 1967, Dheisheh was divided into the villages the refugees were from, and 
this form of organization in the camp has only partially remained today. Most of the 
families living around Ahmad and Khadija are also from Zakariya. Khadija mentioned 
how this aspect united the families during the first years of the camp. “All the women in 
this street were frommy village and we used to clean and cook together, and help each 
other,” she recalled. She continued, “Now, it’s not like that anymore.” Her husband 
clarified how, after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, many fled from the 
camp. According to Ahmad, out of 18,000 residents, only 7,000 refugees stayed in 
Dheisheh. Once the camp was empty, Ahmad explained that many Palestinians from 
neighboring areas started moving to the camp to take advantage of the aid it received 
from UNRWA. Most of Ahmad and Khadija’s family stayed, and the camp welcomed the 
new residents from other villages. 
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 Though their recollection of Zakariyais still vivid in memories, Ahmad and 
Khadija seemed confused when asked about the meaning of the right of return. For 
Khadija, this is a very simple idea, it means “To go back to Zakariya, even if only for one 
day, to die there”. It was clear she would go back if she could, but when asked if she truly 
believed she would have the chance, she humbly answered: “Everything that comes from 
God is good”, without showing hope she would see the day of her return. Her husband’s 
answers were similar – for him, the right of return meant returning to his village: “Even if 
they only let me reach the desert in the outskirts of Zakariya, I will go there to dig my 
grave. I would leave my house today and go there.” Yet, Ahmad still believed that the 
only way to go back was through fighting. “Returning will not come from the sky, only 
God knows,” he said, “nobody will give us back the land, we need to fight for it.” 
 In the eyes of Ahmad and Khadija, Zakariyais a magical place, where every 
aspect of life is exceptional. The memory of their village was full of life; it was happier, 
greener, the opposite of the gray, cold streets of the camp. For them, the right of return is 
being able to simply reach this place, and finally rest their bones in the land that gave 
birth to their souls. Everything in their lives is divided along one line – the light before 
the Nakba and the darkness that it followed.  
1.2 Hittin Camp, Jordan 
 Insherah was born in ‘Ajjur, though her family left in 1948 when she was only 
two years old. Still, her accent was an obvious marker of her roots, which remained 
identical to that of Palestinian refugees from 1948 villages. Though she declared she had 
nothing in her possession that reminded her of her village – everything was left behind 
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when they left in the Nakba – she still identified ‘Ajjur as her place of origin. She could 
mention some general information about her village – especially about the agriculture of 
‘Ajjur; the grapes, figs and olives that her family used to grow. Insherah felt displaced in 
Hittin – as she pointed to the room around us, she exclaimed: “This is not my home, I feel 
like I am just renting this house here, it’s not my place”. She also explained how she had 
lived in Karameh and in Baqa’a before settling in Hittin camp after 1967, but that she still 
had more contact with people who came from her village. 
 Similar to the first generation of Dheisheh, Insherah did not seem to give much 
thought to what the right of return meant. For her, it was also simple: “Returning to the 
land that belongs to us, this is not our land.” It was not clear, however, if she meant all of 
Palestine or ‘Ajjur specifically. The lack of specific memories from her land made it 
seem like she saw all of Palestine as her home, and longed either her return or her 
children’s. When asked if she believed she would be able to fulfill this dream, her answer 
was almost identical to that of Khadija, from Dheisheh: “It’s up to God, not to people.” 
 During all interviews conducted in Hittin, Insherah would follow me and guide 
her children’s answers. Though she herself was not sure if she would see the day she 
would return, it was important for her to instill that feeling in her family. If a member of 
her family showed any doubts, she would assure me: “We will return, inshallah we will 
return.” Her children would nod and correct their answers, looking down and whispering 
“Inshallah,”as she firmly stood next to them. 
2. Second Generation 
2.1 Dheisheh Camp, Palestine 
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Fatima grew up in Dheisheh after 1967, when the camp changed its demography 
following the occupation of the West Bank. Though she also lives on “Zakrawyastreet”, 
named after Zakariya where her family is from, she was not always surrounded by those 
from the same village as her parents. When introducing herself, she referred first to her 
camp, then to her village. She clarified,“I present myself saying my full name and the 
name of my camp.But from my last name, people know I am from Zakaryia.”Her cousin 
Salah, who wasalso interviewed, had a similar response: “I tell people I am from the 
camp, but originally from Zakaryia.” Though Salah did not have anything specific that 
reminded him of the camp or Zakaryia, Fatima was very descriptive: “My life is the 
camp. It has a certain special smell, it reminds of my childhood here.” She explained 
what connects her to her camp: 
“The camp is not made of stones, it’s made of its people. We are not connected 
byphysical, we are connected to the individuals. I remember a story – when I was 
working in the house during the First Intifada – I had bought a new washing bowl 
 for my clothes. It was new and sharp, and I cut my hands while I was (اناء)
holding its sides. When I started cleaning the blood from my hands, my neighbor 
came to my house and saw me. I remember how she washed all my clothes and 
helped me clean my whole house. The camp was like one big family. 
A shared feeling between Fatima and Salah was that the camp represented their 
family, not their parents’ village. Both claimed they feel more connected to Dheisheh 
than to Zakariya. On the other hand, it was remarkable to see how militant their 
perspectives were when speaking about the meaning of the right of return. For Fatima, 
returning means going back by fighting (بالنضال), not bynegotiations. “Whatever the 
world is doing right now, I don’t care about,” she said, “I care about what us as 
Palestinians are doing.” When asked about the diplomatic efforts of the UN, she frowned 
and said she believed they were “useless”. Salah also made use of militant language, 
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though he added a religious meaning to the concept of returning. In his words, returning 
means “to free Al Aqsa from the hands of the kufar (الكفار),the infidels.” In addition, both 
Salah and Fatima agreed they believed they would go back one day: “Even if I was the 
richest person I would go back to my village,” Fatima added.“I miss Zakariya,” she said, 
even she had never been to Zakariya herself. 
In general, the second generation of Dheisheh has developed a connection to the 
camp that goes beyond their original link to their parents’ villages. Dheisheh camp, 
affected deeply by the First and Second Intifada, has established a new identity that is 
strongly associated with the values of community and militancy. Still, returning to 
Zakariya remains in the back of their minds, which they see as their own responsibility to 
achieve. 
2.2 Hittin Camp, Jordan 
 “I am from Palestine, with Jordanian citizenship,” said Yasser, Insherah’s son. He 
does not usually mention his parents’ village ‘Ajjur, only if he is talking to people from 
the same camp as him. He did not seem to know much from ‘Ajjur, other than pictures 
and information that he had researched online. What reminds him the most of the village, 
as he described, are members from the first generation. “Old people remind me of ‘Ajjur. 
They talk about the land, it is my family who reminds us where we are from,” he 
explained. He also mentioned how the first generation connects more to people from their 
own village than his generation. Still, Yasser considers Hittin his second home, while he 
does not return to his homeland. 
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 When asked about the meaning of the right of return, Yasser expounded on the 
idea that Israel did not own the land it has currently. “For me, it is the right of return to 
our land,” he said, “Israel never conquered it, the British simply handed them our 
land.”Somehow in contradiction to his remark, he also commented on the reason why his 
family was forced out of the village: “They were told the Jews were killing everyone in 
the villages around them to scare them away, they did not have another option.” Yasser, 
when speaking of the right of return, had a collective perception of what it meant to go 
back. He expressed hope, but added,“If we ourselves don’t return, our children will. We 
will continue fighting until we have our right.”  
 Yasser also talked about the differences between Palestinian refugees inside and 
outside of historic Palestine. “We are longing to go back to Palestine more than refugees 
who are still inside. We miss it more, they at least get to see the land.” Here, Yasser 
expressed a desire to go back to Palestine as the whole land, as opposed to his specific 
village. Growing up in Jordan, Yasser talked about the challenges as Palestinian as 
opposed to a refugee from the camp. There was no mention of a separate “Hittin 
identity”. 
 Yasser’s sisters were interviewed in a separate room and did not seem to have 
given as much thought to the issue as their brother. Nisreen and Farah, though they 
introduced themselves as originally from ‘Ajjur, had little connection to the village itself 
or to others that shared the same origin as their mother. For instance, they spoke with a 
softer accent, without using the strong sounds that their mother used. However, they both 
shared a utopic perception of Palestine, which according to Farah, was based on what 
their friends and family who had been to the land told them. “Everything is prettier in 
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Palestine”, said Nisreen. Thoughboth did not put stock on the prospect of return, they 
were still assured  that Palestine was their “natural place”. 
 In general terms, the second generation of Hittin did not show a strong connection 
to their village, especially the women. Though Yasser seemed to have more information 
about the political situation and the culture of his village, there was still a collective 
sentiment that returning to Palestine is the main goal – not necessarily to ‘Ajjur. In 
addition, since the family has moved from different camps since 1948 – as it is the case 
for most refugees from this period in Jordan – the camp itself is not a relevant part of 
their Palestinian identity.   
3. Third Generation 
3.1 Dheisheh Camp, Palestine 
 After listening to his grandparents’ interviews, Ibrahim imitated their response 
and told the interviewer he was originally from Zakariya. He hastily corrected himself: 
“No, I am from the camp. When I introduce myself, I usually say I am from Dheisheh.” 
Ibrahim has never traveled outside of the camp, he explained, and therefore Dheisheh is 
home to all of his memories throughout his life. He did not show any special ties with 
other people from the Zakariya families, besides his own cousins. Still, when asked about 
the right of return, Ibrahim’s automatic response was: “The right of return means going 
back to our land. If I could, of course I would go back.” Ibrahim did not seem very 
confident of returning one day to his village, nor did it seem like this was a central theme 
in his life. For him, the camp was the main part of his identity and the symbol of home. 
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 His cousin Rima had even less of a connection to the concept of returning. Rima, 
when presenting herself, only mentioned her full name and the name of her camp. Her 
family, friends and house are the main components of her identity, which are connected 
more to Dheisheh than Zakariya – as her cousin, the only friendships she has that are 
from her original village are with her cousins. Rima’s perception of the right of return 
was influenced by her father’s answer, Salah: “The most important return is a return to 
religion, prayer and fasting,” she explained. The right of return in terms of Palestine was 
not a main concern for Rima, Islam was the most important part of her identity as a 
member of the camp. She seemed uncomfortable speaking to a male interviewer and kept 
her responses straight and religiously oriented. 
 Ibrahim and Rima showed little connection to the concept of returning to their 
village or the militant language of the past generation. For them, the camp was their 
home and the main component of their identity as refugees. 
3.2 Hittin Camp, Jordan 
At first, Razan and Dalal seemed very confused with the idea of return. Razan did 
not talk much, and mostly agreed with whatever Dalal had to say about the matter. 
Dalalexplained she did not have any personal connection to her village, though she still 
identifies herself as a Palestinian-Jordanian. Her friends and connections are not 
originally from one village, or even from the same camp.  
First, when asked about the right of return, they did not know what it meant. 
Dalal’s sister in law, Nisreen, explained to her that it was the right of return to Palestine. 
Dalal simply answered: “It’s returning to the place where we are originally from.” There 
 29 
was no mention of ‘Ajjur, her family’s village. Even so, Dalal did not believe she would 
have the chance to return one day, or any will to fight for retuning either to Palestine or to 
‘Ajjur itself.Razan expressed she would return if she could, but did not believe that was 
possible at this point.  
4. Dheisheh and Hittin: Cross-Generation Analysis 
4.1 Similarities Encountered 
In both camps, the belief in the right of return has increasingly faded throughout 
generations. The first generation of refugees, both in Hittin and Dheisheh, is fighting to 
instill hope in their grandchildren, but when interviewed individually, the third generation 
showed disbelief in fulfilling their right of return. This sentiment was more often found in 
women from the third generation, who did not seem as politically aware of the current 
discussions on the matter. Additionally, contact with their original villages now inside the 
Israeli state, has decreased substantially due to movement restrictions. Still, the second 
generation still revealed a longing for return, though it expressed itself in different ways 
in Palestine and in Jordan. 
There were a number of overlapping themes in each generation. The identity of 
the first generation is still deeply connected to the villages they were expelled from in 
1948. Their hope of return was associated with religious faith, perceived by the mention 
of “God” in all statements. The second generation, on the other hand, perceived the 
Palestinian people as the agents responsible for fulfilling the right of return. Both men 
and women of this generation expressed fighting and armed struggle as the means to that 
end, as well as resentment with the intervention of the international community on the 
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conflict. In addition, the second generation also shared a utopic perspective of either 
Palestine or their parents’ village, even though the members interviewed had never seen 
to their land themselves. In terms of the third generation, answers were similar in both 
camps – the right of return and connection to their land were not main concerns to the 
members interviewed. 
4.2 Disparities 
 While the first generation of Dheisheh refugees expressed a personal wish to 
return and be buried in their village, in Hittin, this hope was articulated as a collective 
wish to go back one day, whatever generation of the family it may be. In addition, 
Dheisheh stories showed traces of a construction of a community based on their village of 
origin, that the displacement of Palestinian refugees to different camps in Jordan did not 
allow. This sentiment continued upon the second generation in Dheisheh, whose 
members still live in the street named after their parents’ village, and connect the right of 
return to this their families’ land. In Hittin, on the other hand, the wish to return was 
associated to going back to Palestine as a whole, and not a specific location.   
 Finally, the major difference between Palestinian refugees in Dheisheh and Hittin 
is the presence of a “camp identity” that Palestinian-Jordanian interviewees lacked of. 
Residents of Dheisheh, in most generations, have included the camp as a main part of 
their identity and the stage of their memories growing up. In the case of the second 
generation, this was influenced by the impact of the First and Second Intifada in the 
camp, which has brought the camp together working as a community. The displacement 
of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan to multiple camps, as well as the absence of a 
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continues and direct intervention from the occupation, prevented a feeling of community 
present in Dheisheh narratives. 
5. The PLO, the United Nations and the Right of Return 
 Meanwhile, at the United Nations, the PLO has also brought up the issue of the 
right of return of Palestinian refugees, but in rather particular way. This section will focus 
on three key instances: the April 2013 address to the Security Council delivered by Dr. 
Ryad Mansour, the Ambassador of Palestine at the United Nations; President Mahmoud 
Abbas’ address at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly on September 2013; 
the April 2014 address by Ambassador Riyad Mansour before the Security Council; and 
finally the address at the September 2015 General Assembly on raising the Palestinian 
flag at the UN, presented by Ambassador Mansour. 
5.1 Security Council Address by Ambassador Riyad Mansour, April 2013 
During the open debate on the situation in the Middle East on April 2013, 
Ambassador Riyad Mansour addressed the United Nations Security Council on the 
Palestine Question. His speech focuses mainly on how Israeli policies have continuously 
caused challenges to the viability of the two-state solution, while the PLO has constantly 
abided to the agreement, “based on the longstanding parameters that are well-known to 
everyone in this Chamber.”25  Ambassador Mansour, when advocating for Palestine 
before the Security Council, referred mainly to Palestinian diplomatic efforts towards 
                                                          
25"Statement by Ambassador Dr. Riyad Mansour, before the United Nations Security Council, 
Open Debate on the Situation in the Middle East including the Palestine Question on 24 April 
2013." Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. April 24, 2013. Accessed 
November 28, 2015.  
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peace such as follow-up meetings with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and meetings 
with the Arab Ministerial Follow-up Committee.  In his words, “the Arab commitment to 
peace, reaffirmed for over a decade in the context of the Arab Peace Initiative, is 
unquestionable.”26By choosing this strategy, Ambassador Mansour’s main basis for 
Palestinian legitimacy is the acceptance and commitment to the two-state solution on the 
basis of 1967 borders. 
In terms of the right of return, the issue was mentioned briefly under the 
following context: 
“On our part, once again, in this Chamber, I reaffirm the commitment of the 
Palestinian leadership to a peaceful settlement in accordance with the two-State 
solution.  However, I must stress that at the core of this commitment is our 
obligation to preserve the dignity of the Palestinian people and ensure justice for 
them.  Essential to this is fulfillment of their national aspirations and rights, 
including the right of our refugees to return and the right to self-determination in 
our independent State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital.”27 
Here, the right of return remains one of the main appeals of the PLO before the United 
Nations, along with the right of self-determination and East Jerusalem as the capital of 
the State of Palestine. On the other hand, there was no focus on the terms of the right of 
return or any emphasis on the importance of this point. While the call for the feasibility 
of Palestine as a state was promoted through a specific strategy – the two-state solution 
on the basis of 4 June 1967 borders – the right of return for Palestinian refugees was 
intertwined with less practical language such as “the dignity of the Palestinian people”. 
Still, Palestinian self-determination and defined borders, agreed before the international 
community, are the PLO’s main point of concern.  




Additionally, Ambassador Mansour did acknowledge problems the PLO and PA 
have faced in terms of political unity: “On the internal Palestinian front, we continue to 
strive for an end to the political division”.He also added that: “We are hopeful that 
elections can soon be undertaken in continuation of the democratic path we have 
chosen,”28 focusing his strategy on democratic values that would resonate with members 
of the Security Council.  
5.2 General Assembly Address by President Mahmoud Abbas, September 2013 
In September 2013, President Mahmoud Abbas addressed the sixty-eighth session 
of United Nations General Assembly for the first time in the name of the “State of 
Palestine”, one year following the UN’s recognition of Palestine as a “non-member 
observer state”.President Abbas opened his remarks by thanking the international 
community and reminding the Assembly that the State of Palestine “abides by the United 
Nations Charter, by international humanitarian law and by the resolutions of international 
legitimacy.”29 He spoke extensively on the path that the PLO has followed towards 
negotiations, stressing three main goals on the behalf of the Palestinian people: the 
establishment of a independent and sovereign state on all land occupied in 1967; the 
recognition of East Jerusalem as its capital; and a solution to the refugee issue “in a just 
agreed upon solution, according to United Nations resolution 194.”30 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29"Statement by H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Abbas, President of the State of Palestine, at the General 
Debate of the Sixty-eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly – New York, 26 
September 2013." Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. September 26, 
2013. Accessed December 28, 2015. 
30 Ibid. 
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When mentioning the United Nations resolution 194, President Abbas referred to 
the General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 1948, which as mentioned before states that 
“refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should 
be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date” and that “compensation should be 
paid for the property of those choosing not to return.”By using resolution 194 to define 
the right of return for Palestinian refugees, President Abbas makes use of the ambiguity 
of the language of this document, which gives leeway for negotiations on the matter. 
While “all land occupied in 1967” and “recognition of East Jerusalem as its capital” are 
very clear requests by the PLO, the appeal for the right of return has important limitations 
on how this right would be implemented, which does not delineate the location of return 
and gives alternative options (i.e. compensation) as a resolution. 
As it was the case with Ambassador Mansour’s address earlier that year, President 
Abbas focused on the PLO’s commitment to the two-state solution which the Palestinian 
National Council in 1988 “had the necessary courage to accept (…) on the borders of 4 
June 1967, establishing a Palestinian State on 22% of the land of historic Palestine.”31 
Surprisingly, President Abbas even commented on how this solution would be 
advantageous for State of Israel, envisioning “a future in which Israel will gain the 
recognition of 57 Arab and Muslim countries,”32 implying that once the State of Palestine 
is viable, even if it is established on 22% of its land, it would guarantee the respect of the 
Arab world. 




President Abbas also made use of Palestinian national culture, such as the poet 
Mahmoud Darwish. He stated: “We – as Mahmoud Darwish wrote – ‘cultivate hope’, and 
we ‘shall one day be what we want’: a free sovereign people on the land of the State of 
Palestine.” By interpreting Darwish’s words, President Abbas’ main message is that the 
Palestinian people’s current and ultimate aspiration is to become an independent state, 
though still framing his speech under the two-state solution agreement. 
Yet, President Abbas referred extensively to the Nakba and the lives of refugees 
in the camps, sharing personal experience and connection to this narrative: 
“I am personally one of the victims of Al-Nakba, among the hundreds of 
thousands of my people uprooted in 1948 from our beautiful world and thrown 
into exile. Like hundreds of thousands of Palestine refugees, I have known as a 
youth the pain of exile and the tragedy of the loss of loved ones in massacres and 
wars, and the difficulties of building a new life from zero. And we tasted in 
refugee camps in exile the bitter taste of poverty, hunger, illness and humiliation, 
as well as rising to the challenge of affirming one’s identity.”33 
President Abbas also uses refugee rhetoric as part of his personal identity before 
the United Nations, which he somehow conflictingly uses as a point of legitimacy 
for his commitment to the two-state solution as well. His strategy focuses on how 
much the Palestinian people has suffered since the Nakba,which he frames as the 
reason behind the alleged motivation towards peace and statehood. Further in his 
address, President Abbas does recognize that the people of Palestine has at times 
“walked the path of armed revolution,” but adds that they have “affirmed at all 
times our active quest for peacemaking.” President Abbas claims that even at 
times of despair and injustice, the Palestinian people, represented by the PLO, 
have always offered an olive branch for the end of conflict. Finally, President 
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Abbas concluded his speech focusing on three points: “freedom for the 
Palestinian people,”“independence of Palestine” and“peace.” 
5.3 Security Council Address by Ambassador Riyad Mansour, April 2014 
Ambassador Riyad Mansour addressed the United Nations Security Council on 
the Palestine Question, during the open debate on the situation in the Middle East in April 
2014. The Ambassador’s address used similar language to that of his April 2013 address 
on the matter, using internationally recognized agreements such as United Nations 
resolutions, Madrid Principles, Arab Peace Initiative and Quartet Roadmap in order to, in 
his words, stress “the criticalness of the hour to salvage the two-State solution on the 
basis of the pre-1967 border.”34 Ambassador Mansour also held the international 
community accountable for resuming peace negotiations, asking specifically for the 
following: maintaining pre-1967 borders; halting Israeli settlement activities, (specially in 
East Jerusalem); and once again called for “respect for the rights of the Palestine refugees 
in accordance with resolution 194 (III).”35 As observed, the right of return remains the 
least specific request, due to the ambiguity in the document chosen by the PLO as the 
framework for negotiating the return of Palestinian refugees before the international 
community.  
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On the other hand, Ambassador Mansour, when mentioning the Nakba, did not 
use the same rhetoric used by President Abbas the previous year. The Ambassador stated 
that, “despite the burdens of occupation and sixty-six years of Al-Nakba,”36 Palestinians 
have done their part “to uphold international law and to act in good faith in the context of 
all initiatives and negotiations aimed at resolving this tragic conflict.” The use of the 
word “despite” is key, because unlike President Abbas’ address, it suggests that the 
motivation for peace does not come from the roots of continues despair.  
Another important remark during Ambassador Mansour’s address was the use of 
the international consensus on UN resolutions on the question of Palestine to reaffirm his 
request for, in his words, “completely ending the Israeli occupation that began in 1967.”37 
By using 1967 as the initial date for the Israeli occupation, as opposed to 1948, 
Ambassador Mansour is framing his requests on the premise that demands related to the 
Nakba are secondary to those post-1967. This becomes contradictory, once he mentions 
resolution 194 in the end of the same paragraph. 
5.4 General Assembly Address by Ambassador Riyad Mansour, September 2015 
On September 10th 2015, Ambassador Ryad Mansour addressed the United 
Nations General Assembly on the vote of the Draft Resolution (A/69/L.87/Rev.1) on the 
raising of flags of non-member observer states. Generally, the Ambassador thanked the 
international community for supporting the “realization of the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people, including to self-determination and independence.”38 However, 
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Ambassador Mansour swiftly linked national aspirations of the Palestinian people to the 
refugee problem, referencing “5 million Palestine refugees in camps throughout the 
region continue to endure repeated tragedies, all awaiting the realization of their rights.”39 
Most of the Ambassador’s speech then focused on the self-determination and 
independence of the State of Palestine, with no mention of the right of return whatsoever. 
Once again, his speech showed a pattern of how the PLO has presented the question of 
Palestine before the United Nations, which constantly links the Palestinian refugee issue 
with national aspirations based on the two-state solution, notwithstanding the 
contradictions that this parallel reveals. 
Conclusion 
 
 In statements made over the past three years as a “non-member state” at the 
United Nations, the PLO has fundamentally based their rhetoric on its commitment to the 
two-state solution, and to the obstacles and challenges the Israeli government have posed 
along the path to achieving this goal. The discussion on Palestinian refugee rights 
developed from the efforts of ensuring human rights to the victims of the Nakba, to 
advocating for a political solution, namely assigning territories to two people. In terms of 
the right of return, the PLO has followed the same tactic it adopted in 1988, using UN 
resolution 194 (III) as the basis for discussing the return of Palestinian refugees from 
1948. This has limited the viability and the implementation of the right of return to 
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historic Palestine in its original sense. Surely, one can understand the reasoning behind 
the shift in the PLO’s approach – it is clear that calling for the dissolution of Israel and 
the return of all 1948 refugees is a politically impossible demand. Nevertheless, it is still 
key to understand that while the PLO has shifted its strategy, the political aspirations of 
Palestinian refugees today have not followed the same pattern. The recent PLO 
statements at the UN simply cannot be interpreted as the political thermometer of 
Palestinian society, especially in the case of refugees currently living in the camps. As 
revealed by Pollock’s polls mentioned earlier, less than a quarter of Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza today consider the establishment of a state as a political priority, 
and the majority still supports armed resistance towards the liberation of all of historic 
Palestine. 
 Meanwhile, Palestinian refugees interviewed in the camps in both Palestine and 
Jordan revealed similar sentiments. The results of this study reveal that refugees do not 
connect as much to the idea of a state, but rather to the ability of reclaiming their rights 
denied by the Nakba. The ability of reaching their rightful lands and passing them on to 
the next generations is far more significant than the prospects of a peace resolution to the 
conflict through the two-state solution, illustrated by the militant language used by 
interviewees in both the first and second generations. This appeared in a greater extent in 
Palestine, where the camps have been more directly affected by the impact of the First 
and Second Intifada. Furthermore, the hypothesis that the dream of returning is still alive 
in the camps is correct – the nostalgia encountered by Ilana Feldman’s study in Gaza is 
also a key component of the first and second generation of refugees in Palestine and 
Jordan. In fact, identical statements such as “everything is prettier in Palestine” and 
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wishes to return “even if only for one day, to die there” were often emphasized by the 
participants. The claim that Palestinians have lost hope in the possibility of return, on the 
other hand, mainly pertains to the third generation in both Palestine and Jordan. It is not 
clear, however, if this is linked to increasing frustration with the PLO, since this 
generation did show signs of a high political awareness of the current situation. Instead, 
this resentment was more present in the second generation, in both locations. Finally, it is 
not necessarily true that Palestinian refugees in Jordan are more likely to still believe in 
the right of return than those residing in Palestine. What can be concluded instead is that 
due to Palestinian-Jordanian refugees’ connection to the idea of Palestine as a whole, as 
opposed to a local identity with a specific village, Palestinian refugees in Jordan may be 
more open to the PLO’s rhetoric on Palestinian statehood. 
What can be identified as the main gap between the refugees’ sentiments on the 
ground and the way the PLO has advocated for their rights is rooted in the narrative 
around Palestinian struggle and the Nakba. While Palestinians refugees have used 
narratives of struggle and dispossession towards the motivation for the liberation of 
historic Palestine, the PLO twisted the same narrative into motivations for peace and 
statehood. The PLO has capitalized on the stereotype of the “good Palestinians”, similar 
the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” binaries that have emerged in the West, reconstructing 
selective positive image of Palestinian history that would resonate with the international 
community. As Andrew Shryock explains, the phenomenon of the “good Muslim” has 
been constructed around common features such as being peaceful, politically moderate 
and an “advocate of democracy, human rights, and religious freedom, an opponent of 
 41 
armed conflict against the U.S. and Israel.”40 This has led the PLO to opt for an adapted 
version of Palestinian nationalism, which portrays the Palestinian refugee identity as an 
ideal partner for peace, a people that has turned sixty-seven years of displacement and 
occupation into, in Abbas’ words, an “active quest for peacemaking.”As this study 
shows, this reading is a misinterpretation of the conviction of Palestinian refugees in the 
camps, who to this day still cultivate the hope of one day returning to historic Palestine 
and reclaiming their right of return. 
Study Limitations 
While using this study as a reference, the reader should take into account that this 
study represents the opinions of twelve refugees residing in two camps with their own 
specific contexts. Hattin and Dheisheh may not be representative of the sentiments of 
other camps that have had different experiences related to them of this study. In addition, 
more women than men were interviewed in Hittin, which may also influence in the 
results of the section on Jordanian refugees’ opinions. 
Another important factor that has limited this research is that the interviewees 
were not specifically asked about their sentiments towards the two-state solution, and 
how this relates to their perspectives on their right of return. A worthwhile way to further 
this study would be to ask Palestinian refugees if they would still want to return to their 
villages if that meant living under Israeli rule as law-abiding citizens. This would give a 
                                                          
40Shryock, Andrew. "Introduction: Islam as an Object of Fear and Affection." 
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Figure 1: Sixty-seven years of a Lost Inheritance 
 
Father brings his to son for the first time to see their family’s original village, Zakariya, 
under Israeli control since the Nakba. Pictured is the view from the top hill in Britannia 
Park, planted by the National Jewish Fund in 1950s after the newly established State of 





1. Interview Questions (English) 
a. Theme 1: The Development of Palestinian refugee identity 
i. Q1: How do you describe the place where you are from? 
ii. Q2: What is the thing that reminds you the most about your homeland? 
b. Theme 2: Geographic Distance and Right of Return 
i. Q1: Do you feel connected to your land here where you live? Why? 
ii. Q2: In the camp, to what extent do you feel more connected to the people 
that come from the same homeland (i.e. village) as you? 
c. Theme 3: Definition of the Right of Return 
i. Q1: What does the right of return mean to you?  
ii. Q2: Do you believe you will have the chance to return to live in your 
homeland? If you had this chance today, would you return to live there? 
2. Interview Questions (Arabic) 
 القسم األول: التطور لهوية الالجئين الفلسطينيين. -أ
a. كيف تصف المكان الذي أتيت منه؟ 
b. ما أكثر شيء يذكرك بموطنك؟ 
 القسم الثاني: البعد الجغرافي و حق العودة. -ب
a. هل تشعر باالرتباط في المكان الذي تعيش فية اآلن؟ كيف؟ 
b. جائوا من نفس القرية أو المدينة التي  : في المخيم، إلى أي مدى تشعر باألرتباط بالناس الذين
 جئت منها انت؟
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 القسم الثالث: تعريف حق العودة. -ت
a. ماذا يعني لك حق العودة؟ 
b.  هل تعتقد انك ستحصل على فرصة للعودة إلى وطنك األم؟ إذا حصلت على تلك الفرصة
 اليوم، هل ستعود للعيش هناك؟
3. Consent Form (English) 
1. Brief description of the purpose of this study 
The goal of this study is to analyze how the right of return of Palestinian refugees 
has been represented in the international community and the difference between 
what is discussed in the United Nations and the sentiments of Palestinian refugees 
in the camps.  
2. Rights Notice 
 
In an endeavor to uphold the ethical standards of all SIT ISP proposals, this study 
has been reviewed and approved by a Local Review Board or SIT Institutional 
Review Board. If at any time, you feel that you are at risk or exposed to 
unreasonable harm, you may terminate and stop the interview. Please take some 
time to carefully read the statements provided below. 
a. Privacy - all information you present in this interview may be recorded 
and safeguarded. If you do not want the information recorded, you need 
to let the interviewer know. 
 
b. Anonymity - all names in this study will be kept anonymous unless the 
participant chooses otherwise.  
 
c. Confidentiality - all names will remain completely confidential and fully 
protected by the interviewer. By signing below, you give the interviewer 
full responsibility to uphold this contract and its contents. The interviewer 
will also sign a copy of this contract and give it to the participant. 
 
 
_________________________                                 _____________________________ 
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Participant’s name printed                                        Participant’s signature and date                                                        
_________________________                                 _____________________________ 
Interviewer’s name printed                                       Interviewer’s signature and date 
4. Consent Form (Arabic) 
 استمارةالموافقة
 وصفموجزللغرضمنهذهالدراسة
النطاق العالمي واالختالف بين ما يتم نقاشه في االمم  الهدف من هذه الدراسة تحليل كيف يتم تقديم حق العودة على
 المتحدة وما يشعره الالجئ الفلسطيني في مخيمات الالجئين .
 اشعار الحقوق
،فقدتم استعراض و الموافقة علىهذهالدراسة من ISP SITفيمسعىلدعمالمعاييراألخالقيةفيجميع مقترحات
SITقبللجنةمراجعةمحليةأولجنة مراجعةتابعة لمؤسسة التعلم العالمية  ا إذاشعرت في اي وقت بالمخاطرةأواذ.  
. واردةأدناهالبيانات ال الرجاءأن تأخذ بعضالوقتلتقرأبعناية.  لضررغيرمنطقي،فيمكنكإنهاءووقفالمقابلةت تعرض  
المعلومات ترغب بتسجيل  إذاكنتال.  لتيتقدمفيهذهالمقابلةسيتمتسجيلهاوحمايتهاجميع المعلومات ا -الخصوصية.أ
 صوتياً،الرجاء اعالم الشخص الذي يقوم بالمقابلة بذلك.
 
.خالفذلكة سيتماالحتفاظبجميعاألسماءفيهذهالدراسةمجهولةإالإذااختارالمشاركعدمالكشفعنالهوية. ب  
  
،أنتعطي منخالاللتوقيعأدناه.  جميعاألسماءسريةتماماومحميةبالكاملمنقبل الشخص الذييجريالمقابلةستبقى  -السرية.ج
سوفيوقع الشخص الذي يقوم . الشخص الذي يقوم بالمقابلةالمسؤوليةالكاملةالستخدامهذاالعقدومحتوياته
. بالمقابلةأيضانسخةمنهذاالعقدوسيتم اعطائهاإلىالمشارك  
 
ن المشاركيشعربعدماالرتياحاتجاهالدراسةفيأيفترةفيالوقت،فمنضمإذاكان  - حقالرفض. د
حقوقهبالكاملرفضاالستمرارفيالدراسةوطلب عدم استخدام اي من المعلومات التي تم جمعها حتى النقطة التي تم  
لمقابلة.للمشاركينأيضاالحقفيرفضاإلجابةعلىأيسؤال ال يشعرون بالراحة بشأنهخالال. التوقف فيها عن اكمال المقابلة  
 
. المشاركةفيهذاالبحثهوطوعيتماماوليسهناكأيتعويض–التعويض.ه  
 
هذا البحث يمكنأنيستخدمفيدراساتمستقبلية فقط اذا اتصل الباحث بأسماء المشاركين الذين –االستخدامفيالمستقبل.و
. تمت مقابلتهم و يكون هذا بعد أخذ الموافقة منهم مرة أخرى معنموذجموافقة ثان  
 
_________اسمالمشارك ________ توقيعالمشاركوالتاريخ ____________  _________ 
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